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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintiftfAppellee, : Case No. 20000135-CA 
vs. : Priority No. 2 
VALERIE D. THOMPSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(c). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed clear error in requiring the trial of the 
Appellant to proceed concurrently with the trial of Appellant's daughter? 
A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
To obtain appellate relief, the Appellant must demonstrate that: "(i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is 
harmful..." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993) 
2. Whether the trial court committed clear error in allowing the Appellant's 
counsel to proceed at a joint trial representing both Appellant and her daughter, or did 
the trial court have an obligation to determine that both defendants were advised of the 
potential conflict of interest and insure that a voluntary waiver of joint representation 
was made by the two defendants? 
To obtain relief, the Appellant must meet the standard set forth above under 
paragraph 1. 
3. Whether Appellant was denied effective assistance counsel where she was 
represented by the same attorney as her daughter at a joint trial involving conflicting 
issues and interests? 
A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah 1990). 
"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court 
can only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it 
can do so as a matter of law...If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but 
prejudice cannot be determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State 
v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson, 805 P.2d 461,465 
(Utah App. 1993). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that 
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2025 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 
P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant upon a notice which did 
not comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §§ 53a-l 1-101(3) and 53a-l 1-
103(l)(b)? 
The question of whether or not the notice required by §§ 53a-l 1-101(3) and 53a-
1 l-103(l)(b) was met by the notice provided to the Appellant is a question of law. A 
trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932 (Utah 1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Valerie D. Thompson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment 
imposed by the Honorable Scott N. Johansen on January 20, 2000, after a bench trial 
at which she was convicted of one count of violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53a-l 1-101 
(3) Compulsory Education Violation, A Class B Misdemeanor. (R. 83) 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Appellant was charged with violating the Compulsory Education Act by not 
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responding to written request of her pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 53a-ll-103(l)(b) by a local school board or school district, case number 983932, 
a criminal prosecution. On December 16, 1999, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty 
and the matter was set for trial. (R. 02) On January 20,2000, Appellant was tried at a 
bench trial before the Honorable Scott N. Johansen. At the same trial, Appellant's 
daughter, E.T., was tried in case number 964962 for two truancy violations. Both 
Appellant and E.T. were represented in the trial by Keith Chiara (R.26:2). Following 
a bench trial at which evidence was presented by the State against both Appellant and 
E.T., Appellant was convicted of a Class B Misdemeanor by failing to respond to a 
written request delivered to her pursuant to the statute and sentenced to six months in 
the Emery County Jail and a fine of $500.00. All but two days of the jail time was 
suspended (R. 26:83, 95-96). 
C. Appellate Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On February 10, 2000, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing her 
conviction to this court. Appellant filed a Rule 23B Motion to Remand which was 
denied by this court on September 12,2000. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellant was charged with violating the Compulsory Education Act by not 
responding to written request of her by a local school board or school district pursuant 
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to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 53a-l l-103(l)(b), case number 983932. 
Appellant's daughter, E.T., also had been charged with truancy violations which were 
also scheduled for trial on the same day (R. 26: 2). The trial court, prosecutor and 
defense counsel were unsure of which matters were before the court for trial, with the 
Appellant's counsel indicating to the court that he thought that the matters were there 
for review (R. 26:2-6). Defense counsel indicated that because of the confusion, he had 
requested a continuance of the matters in order to be prepared (R. 26: 3-4). 
There was no advisement on the record in which the court advised either the 
Appellant or E.T. that there may be a conflict of interest by Mr. Chira representing both 
parties. At several times during the hearing, defense counsel indicated to the court that 
he was confused, not sure of what evidence he could present, and what issues were 
before the court (R.26: 5,21,23-24). At one point, during the State's examination of 
a witness concerning statements made to him by Appellant relating to E.T.'s case, 
defense counsel objected, then realizing that Appellant was also a defendant, withdrew 
his objection (R.26:19). 
The State called one witness, Merlin Weber, principal of San Rafael Junior High 
School, who testified that E.T. had been registered for the 1999-2000 school year 
(R.26: 11). Mr. Weber testified that he sent state's exhibits 5,6,7, and 8 addressed 
to Appellant R.26:16-19). Exhibit 6 was the only letter which requested the Appellant 
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to "come in and talk about how to solve the problem." Other than the letters sent by 
principal Weber, there were no notices sent by any official of the Emery County School 
District. 
Both Appellant and E.T. testified during the trial. Appellant testified as to the 
medical and other reasons why E.T. had not attended school (R. 26: 40-55). She also 
testified to numerous contacts with school personnel and attempts to contact Mr. 
Weber the school principal concerning E.T.'s failure to attend school in the school year 
beginning September 1999 (R.26: 61-64). 
The trial court found: "I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother, and 
there is no evidence with respect to the father and he hasn't been charged, that the 
mother knowingly refused to respond to written request delivered to her pursuant to the 
provisions of the section" (R.26: 83). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant raises four issues on appeal. One, that the trial court erred in requiring 
the trial of the Appellant to proceed at the same time as the trial of her daughter E.T. 
First, Appellant argues that the elements of the ofifenses which were tried were 
different; second, that the defendants were not co-defendants and that joiner was 
improper; third, that evidence which would not be available in Appellant's case had 
there not been a joint trial was allowed since she was tried in the same proceeding as 
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her daughter; and fourth, that the court was able to consider evidence which was not 
relevant to the case of Appellant, but which was relevant to the case of the daughter 
which affected the court's determination in Appellant's case. 
Two, that the trial court erred in requiring Appellant's counsel to proceed in 
representing Appellant and her juvenile daughter in the same proceeding. Upon being 
informed by trial counsel, that he was not aware of the nature of the proceedings, that 
he was not prepared to proceed and having requested a continuance to ascertain the 
nature of the proceedings, the trial court had an obligation to inquire of the Appellant 
and juvenile whether they both agreed to joint representation and whether they 
understood the potential conflict of interest by being represented by one attorney in a 
proceeding which combined to distinctively different offenses. Appellant argues that 
the "fairness" considered by the appellate court in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d. 524 was 
not available to Appellant where counsel at the outset of the trial was not aware he 
would be representing Appellant at trial. The trial court had an obligation to ensure that 
fairness or at least obtain a voluntary waiver of conflict of interest by advising 
Appellant of the conflict and obtaining a knowing waiver prior to forcing the joint trial. 
Third, Appellant argues that defense counsels representation of the Appellant 
was ineffective where he indicated to the court that he was not aware of the nature of 
the proceedings, that he did not understand that he would be representing the Appellant 
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at trial, where he was not aware that E.T. was also going to be tried at the same time, 
and where the issues and elements of the two offenses against the joint defendants were 
different. 
Fourth, Appellant argues that the court erred as a matter of law in finding that 
she had received the notice required by Utah Code Ann. § 53a-l l-103(b)(l) where the 
exhibit and the evidence indicated that all notice to her was sent, not by the school 
district or local school board as required by statute, but by the principal of the junior 
high school. Appellant argues that where criminal sanctions are to be imposed, the 
State must prove that strict compliance with the requirements of the statute must be 
followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
REQUIRING THE TRIAL OF THE APPELLANT TO PROCEED 
CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF E.T. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(f) establishes jurisdiction in the juvenile courts 
for the prosecution of the offense of failing to comply with the compulsory education 
requirements of U.C.A. § 53a-l 1-101. Section 78-3a-802(2) requires that proceedings 
under the section be governed by the statutes and rules governing criminal proceedings 
in the district court. In this case, the trial court ordered the trial of Appellant to be 
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joined together with the trial of E.T., a juvenile charged under a totally separate 
provision of the code. 
The statue which governs when defendants may be joined for trial in the adult 
system is U.C.A. § 77-8a-l. That section provides that the only time two defendants 
can be joined for trial is when the offenses and the defendants could have been joined 
in a separate Information. U.C.A. § 77-8a-l(3)(a) Two defendants may be joined in 
a separate Information only if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. U.C.A. § 77-8a-l(l)(b) Based upon the 
provisions cited, even if the Appellant and E.T. were adults, they could not be joined 
for trial since the elements of the offenses involve different conduct undertaken at 
different time periods. The offense of truancy involve the failure to attend school 
without a legitimate excuse. The offense of committing a violation of the mandatory 
education act as charged against the Appellant requires simply that after receiving a 
written request from the school for parental support in securing regular attendance, the 
defendant fails to respond. The elements are totally dissimilar. 
Although the statute in subsection (4)(b) indicates that a defendant's right to 
sever is waived if the motion is not made at least five days prior to trial, Appellant was 
foreclosed from making that motion since prior to the actual start of the trial, the parties 
and offenses were not joined, but were only joined at the trial court's insistence at the 
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beginning of Appellant's trial. Although the court did ask counsel representing both 
the Appellant and E.T. whether he had any objection to a joint proceeding, that 
question was asked at the time when E.T.'s counsel was not aware that her truancy had 
not already been determined. (R.26: 2-3) After the court and counsel determined that 
in fact E.T.'s truancy allegations had not been proven, there was no further discussion 
concerning the effect of the joint trial on the rights of the Appellant or E.T. 
Further, there is no provision for the joining of the trial of an adult charged in the 
juvenile system with that of a juvenile defendant. The court's error in this regard is 
clearly erroneous and requires reversal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PROCEEDING 
WITH APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL REPRESENTING 
BOTH APPELLANT AND E.T. WITHOUT INVESTIGATING 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
At the beginning of the trial, after the trial court had determined to proceed 
with a joint trial and was aware and expected that Appellant's counsel would also 
represent E.T., the trial court made no inquiry or investigation as to whether or not the 
dual representation caused any conflict of interest on the part of either Appellant or 
E.T. "The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right 
to counsel free from conflicts of interest" (State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,79 (Utah App. 
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1990). In State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that when 
two co-defendants are "separately represented by two public defenders from the same 
office and the potential conflict is brought to the attention of the court before or during 
the early stages of trial, the trial court must take adequate steps to resolve the issue. 
If the trial court fails to investigate such a potential conflict of interest, we presume 
prejudice and reverse" (806 P.2d at 1192). 
Appellant argues that although the issue of conflict was not brought up by her 
counsel at the time of trial, the issue was obvious, in that one attorney was representing 
two defendants and the attorney was under the impression that E.T.'s case was not set 
for trial. He was of the impression that E.T.'s guilt had been established and the 
matter was only on for review. Defense counsel's comments indicated that he had 
previously requested a continuance of the court in order to determine which matters 
were actually before the court. The court did not grant the continuance nor did the court 
allow counsel time to confer with his clients to discuss any potential conflict. The 
comments of the court and counsel are particularly revealing in that regard: 
THE COURT: I show we have two trials back to back here. Which one 
do you want to do first? 
MR. LANGSTON: I was going to ask Your Honor how the court wants 
to proceed? It is the same witnesses and we can actually proceed with both of 
them together or we can do it separate. However the court desires to do it. 
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THE COURT: Well, there is no sense hearing from them twice, but. 
MR. LANGSTON: That is my feeling. 
MR. CHIARA: Are we trying Elise's truancy? Is that what is going on? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LANGSTON: Yes. Right. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objections taking all of the testimony at 
once and then we can separate at argument? 
MR. CHIARA: That is okay. I have been informed by the prosecutor 
though that the court had already determined that Elise was truant. That all 
earnest and persistent efforts has been made. I had just assumed that decision 
had already been made in a previous hearing. 
THE COURT: No, what happened is Elise had a truancy last year and 
there was a diversion and it was determined that she had not complied with the 
terms of the diversion but I believe that a new petition was filed or we still back 
on the old deal? 
MR. LANGSTON: The way I understand it is then we reinstated the old 
petition, the old, because the court has already ruled in the December hearing 
that the terms of the old diversion were not complied with so that was set aside 
and so we are now back to where was originally with that petition with the 
truancy. The court has not made a determination whether she was in fact truant 
or not, just that a diversion agreement was not complied with. 
MR. CHIARA: Right. 
MR. LANGSTON: So we are here, as I understand it, for trial on that 
original truancy and that also on the new charges that we filed against Valerie 
for the failure to comply with the compulsory education laws. Those are two 
matters that I understand we are on trial on. 
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THE COURT: What period of time is the truancy for? That is the critical 
question. 
MR. LANGSTON: That would be up until December 18th, I think is the 
way it was filed of last, of 1998. And that was filed by Miss Manley back then 
and that was originally diverted. Then we filed the new charges against Valerie 
that has to do with the period up until from this last school year up until basically 
when the charges were filed in December. 
MR. CHIARA: See these are part of the reasons I was asking this court 
to continue this. To give me time to know just what is going on and be prepared 
on that. I haven't (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me straighten this out, because I don't 
think Mr. Langston's right on this. On the 6th of January we took an arraignment 
on a new truancy charge, incident number four. The original truancy was 
incident number one. And so the new truancy charge was denied, set for trial 
today, and that the critical date there is November 29th of '99. 
Incident number one, the original truancy charge is still out there. I 
assumed that if we took care of the new truancy that the other one would go 
away, but that has never been said. So we have a truancy on Elise, a new 
truancy, that is incident number four, even though it says on the docket that it is 
one. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) it was denied and the assistant county attorney 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Oh, alright, then Mr. Langston is right. 
THE CLERK: It hasn't been. 
THE COURT: Let me back up, Mr. Chiara. The first incident number one 
was the first truancy that was diverted. She failed the diversion. It is now on 
trial today. Incident number four was the second truancy, it was denied on the 
6th of January and not set for trial. It has gone to the county attorney's office for 
screening. So that is what we are here on, incident number one, and then the 
parents information. So let's... 
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MR. CHIARA: All I have in my hands, it looks like, is number four for 
November 29th o f 99. I would request if the court, if the prosecutor is going to 
prosecute on that that we be allowed to put on evidence as to whether earnest 
and persistent efforts were made to comply with that diversion agreement. 
There is a witness here that I think can testify to the court that earnest and 
persistent efforts were made. 
THE COURT: The issue about the diversion agreement is behind us. That 
is res judicata. 
MR. CHIARA: I understand except that my client that Mrs. Thompson 
tells me that she thought it was just a review hearing on how things were going. 
She wasn't aware that it was a matter where... 
THE COURT: She was here and she had it explained to her what it was 
about. We are not going to Ungate things twice. The trial will be on whether or 
not the incident number one, the truancy, is well taken or not. Not whether the 
diversion agreement was complied with. That's... 
MR. CHIARA: Can I have a copy of that then because I don't even have 
a copy of it. 
THE COURT: Yes we can make one in the course of things. I am not 
going to slow down here where we are already an hour late. All it says is it is 
a typical truancy language and the critical date is December 18,1998. 
MR. CHIARA: 1998? 
MR. LANGSTON: 1998. 
MR. CHIARA: '98. 
THE COURT: And in the course of while we are getting started we will 
have this copied and give you a copy of it. 
MR. CHIARA: Excuse me, Your Honor, I have found a copy of it. 
(R. 26: 2-5) 
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The foregoing exchange indicates that the court, prosecutor and the defense 
counsel were confused as to exactly what was being heard. Once the court was aware 
that defense counsel was not aware that E.T.'s case was actually on for trial, not just 
for a review, the court should have inquired concerning the conflict of interest and 
made a record. Under these circumstances, the court had a duty to insure that both 
defendants understood the potential conflict and agreed to the joint representation. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes the 
right to be assisted by counsel who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is 
fair. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, at 685. In State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 
1997) at 533, this Court observed: 
Courts have discussed many examples of attorney conduct that may 
undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process. For example, in 
conjunction with its discussion of what constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Supreme Court in Strickland listed a variety of duties belonging to 
counsel which, if not adhered to, may result in ineffective assistance. The Court 
noted an attorney is required to: advocate the defendant's cause, avoid conflicts 
of interest, "consult with the defendant on important decisionsf,] and keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution." 
Id. at 688,104 S.Ct. At 2065. Failure to investigate is also a form of attorney 
conduct that may undermine the adversarial process. See State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990). Moreover, some conduct, such as various kinds of 
state interference with counsel's assistance and active representation of 
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conflicting interests, is so egregious that it is presumed to result in prejudice to 
defendant's defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. At 2067 
In Classon, this Court recognized that the two-prong Strickland test usually 
requires that the defendant establish that first, counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Second, a defendant must show that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result is reliable. 
Classon, 935 P.2d at 532. Appellant contends that trial counsel's conduct in not at 
least requesting a recess in order to discuss the nature of the proceedings with the two 
defendants, advise them of the potential conflicts, and withdraw from representation 
of one or the other in the event that the conflict in representation could not be resolved 
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Further, it is obvious from the 
record cited above in the conversation between the court and counsel, that counsel was 
not sure what proceedings were taking place and did not feel prepared to proceed. 
It is also clear from the transcript, that counsel felt his lack of preparation to be 
such that he requested the court continue the matters in order to determine what was 
actually before the court and to "know just what is going on and to be prepared on 
that." (R. 26: 3-4). The record is not clear when that request was made, but it is 
undisputed from the record, that defense counsel had made the request because he did 
not feel prepared to proceed and the record cited above indicates his confusion and lack 
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of preparation. 
In addition, counsel agreed to proceed to try both defendants cases at once and 
to represent both defendants although it is apparent that his agreement occurred at a 
time when he was not aware that E.T.'s case involved a trial. Had counsel not agreed, 
the conflict issue may have been less of a problem in the event the court would have 
proceeded on one case at a time. (Based upon the demeanor of the trial judge and his 
comments as set forth above, counsel's objection to joint trial may have been futile). 
The fault here does not only lie with the defense counsel. Appellant argues that 
the record cited above demonstrates the failure of the trial court to allow the 
Appellant's counsel a continuance to become prepared, or even an opportunity to have 
a copy of some of the pleadings which were involved. (R. 26: 5) The court was not 
going to take the time to inquire into any conflicts or concerns whether obvious or 
expressed. "I am not going to slow down here where we are already an hour late." (R. 
26: 5). 
Further, defense counsel did not address whether the state had proved the 
elements of the offense against the Appellant, either in his presentation of evidence 
through the testimony of Appellant and her husband, nor did he address the elements 
in his closing argument to the court. 
The elements of the offense of Compulsory Education Violation as it applies in 
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this case, since the evidence indicated that the Appellant did register E.T. in school for 
the 1999-2000 school year, are as follows: 
1. That between September 1999 and December 1999; 
2. In Emery County, State of Utah; 
3. The defendant, a parent, refused to respond to a written request from the 
school district or local school board for parental support in securing regular attendance 
by the minor delivered by certified mail; 
4. The notice must contain notice of the requirements of §53a-l 1-103 and state 
that refusal to respond to the notice is a Class B Misdemeanor. 
The basis of the charge was the failure to respond after receiving a written 
request from a local school board or school district. Defense counsel's direct and 
cross-examination of the witnesses as well as his closing argument to the court did not 
address those elements. Other than a question of the Appellant as to the contacts she 
had with the school personnel, there were no questions tying those contacts in time with 
the receipt of the communications from Mr. Weber, the school principal, upon which 
the State was basing its case. (R. 26: 61-62) There was no argument made to the court 
that the Appellant had made contact with the school even though State's Exhibit 7, the 
letter dated November 24, 1999,(Addendum "A") from Mr. Weber to Appellant 
indicates that contacts were made, in that Weber obviously responds to the inquiry of 
18 
the Appellant about homework and how to handle that situation. The letter does not 
request any further meetings with Weber or the local school district. This 
communication follows the November 15, 1999, letter, State's Exhibit 6, which, 
although the letter does not contain the notice requirements of the statute, does request 
a meeting to "please come in and lets talk about the problem." (Addendum "B"). 
This evidence is consistent with the testimony of Appellant wherein she testified 
that in response to the certified letters, she contacted the school and attempted to talk 
with Mr. Weber, and when she did and was not able to talk with him, she left messages 
with the secretary and requested he call her back. (R.26: 57-59) This is also consistent 
with Mr. Weber's testimony that he was aware that Appellant had tried to reach him 
at the school on at least two occasions. (R.26:19-20) 
Appellant maintains that counsel's ineffectiveness as set forth above deprived 
her of a fair trial. The acknowledged lack of preparation, lack of awareness as to the 
nature of the proceedings, and failure to address the issue of conflict with Appellant 
create a situation in which Appellant maintains prejudice is presumed. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, at 692. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH THE REQUEST OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
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A. The notice sent to appellant did not comply with the requirements of 
U.C.A. §53a-ll-101(3) and § 53a-ll-303(l)(b). 
As set forth in Appellant's argument above, one of the elements of the offense 
of Compulsory Education Violation, is that the defendant receive a notice complying 
with the provisions of §53a-l l-101(3)(b). One of the requirements is that the notice 
be "delivered by a local school board or school district". The district involved in this 
case is the Emery County School District. All of the communications sent to the 
Appellant were from Mr. Merlin Weber, principal of San Rafael Junior High School. 
Mr. Weber is not a member of the Emery County School District, nor was there any 
evidence that he was authorized or requested to act on behalf of the district. All were 
signed in his capacity as principal, not as a representative of the district. He was not 
elected or authorized by law to act on behalf of a local board or district. From the 
context of the statute, it is apparent that the school board or district is empowered to 
review the situation where there are allegations of a parent who is alleged to have 
violated the statute, determine the necessity to proceed under the statute, and then send 
the written request. A request from a school principal does not meet the statute. 
The court erred in finding that Appellant had failed to comply with a request of 
the school district and her conviction should be overturned. 
B. The evidence indicated that Appellant did comply with the request. 
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Should this Court determine that the notice to Appellant did meet the statutory 
requirements, Appellant argues that her actions did indicate a response. As is set forth 
above, Appellant did respond to the letters of the principal by placing calls in an 
attempt to contact him. She indicated that she had gone to the school to pick up 
homework for E.T. The principal acknowledged that he returned at least two of the 
calls. The requests did not direct Appellant to contact anyone at the district office since 
the letters were not from the district, but from the principal. In the November 24,1999, 
letter from principal Weber, he addresses issues which have obviously been raised by 
Appellant in her contact with the school. 
Further, there is no direction in the letters as to any deadline by which Appellant 
must contact the district, no place at which she was to appear, nor was there any 
indication as to whom she should contact other than principal Weber. In addition, the 
tenor of the November 24, 1999, letter does not suggest that criminal action will be 
pursued by anyone. The letter simply indicates the hope that the homework resolution 
will work out and reminds the Appellant that in the case of absence of E.T., Appellant 
should call in and sent in a doctor's note. 
Based upon the evidence in the record, Appellant contends the court erred in 
finding that she had violated the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, Appellant asks the Court to vacate 
her conviction on the grounds that the trial court failed to adequately investigate the 
issue of conflict of interest, that the trial court improperly required Appellant to proceed 
with a joint trial with her juvenile daughter, that she was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel at the trial, that trial court erred in ruling that the notice sent to Appellant 
complied with the statutes and that the trial court erred in finding that Appellant failed 
to respond to a request from a school board or district. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of October, 2000. 
MICHAEL D.ESPLM 
Counsel for Valerie D. Thompson 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §53 a-11-101(3) 
Utah Code Annotated §53a-l l-103(l)(b) 
Utah Code Annotated §77-8a-l 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(c) 
Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-801(l)(f) 
Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-802(2) 
"A" State's Exhibit 7, letter dated November 24, 1999 
"B" State's Exhibit 6, letter dated November 15, 1999 
23 
53A-11-101 STATE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
PARTI 
COMPULSORY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS 
53A-11-101. Responsibility for minor required to attend 
school — Penalty for violation. 
(1) For purposes of this part: 
(a) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has received more than 
two truancy citations within one school year from the school in which the 
minor is or should be enrolled and eight absences without a legitimate-or 
valid excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the part of school authorities 
to resolve a student's attendance problem as required under Section 
53A-11-103, refuses to regularly attend school or any scheduled period of 
the school day. 
(b) "Minor* means a person under the age of 18 years. 
(c) "Parent" includes: 
(i) a custodial parent of the minor; 
(ii) a legally appointed guardian of a minor; or 
(iii) any other person purporting to exercise any authority over the 
minor which could be exercised by persons listed under Subsections 
(l)(c)(i) and (ii) above. 
(d) "School-age minor" means a minor who has reached the age of six 
years but has not reached the age of eighteen years, but does not include 
a minor emancipated by marriage. 
(e) "Truancy citation" is an administrative notice to a truant minor 
requiring an appearance before the school truancy control officer or body 
from which the minor is truant. 
(f) "Truant minor" is any school-age minor who is subject to the state's 
compulsory education law and who is absent from school without a 
legitimate or valid excuse. 
(2) A parent shall enroll and send a school-age minor to a public or regularly 
established private school during the school year of the district in which the 
minor resides. 
(3) It is a class B misdemeanor for a parent to knowingly: 
(a) fail to enroll a school-age minor in school; or 
(b) refuse to respond to a written request which is delivered to the 
parent pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-ll-103(l)(b) by a local 
school board or school district. 
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to a parent of a school-age 
minor who has been declared by the local school board to be exempt from school 
attendance in conformity with Section 53A-11-102. 
(5) A local board of education or school district shall report violations of 
Subsection (3) to the appropriate city, county, or district attorney. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-11-101, enacted by 
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 146; 1990, ch. 78, § 32; 1999, 
ch. 99, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The% 1999 amend-
ment, effective May 3,1999, added Subsections 
(1) and (4), redesignating former Subsections 
(1), (2), and (3) as (2), (3), and (5); in Subsection 
(2) substituted "parent" for "person having con-
trol of a minor between six and 18 years of age" 
and substituted "enroll and send a school-age 
minor" for "send the minor"; rewrote Subsec-
tion (3); deleted former Subsection (4), which 
provided that juvenile court officers were im-
mediately to take appropriate action; in Sub-
section (5) inserted "or school district" and 
substituted "violations of Subsection (3)" for 
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53A-11-103, Duties of boards of education in resolving 
child's attendance problems — Parental involve-
ment — Issuance of truancy citations — Proce-
dure for contesting citations — Liability not 
imposed. 
(1) For each school-age minor who is or should be enrolled within that school 
district, the local school board or school district shall make efforts to resolve a 
minor's school attendance problems. Those efforts shall include, as reasonably 
feasible: 
(a) counseling of the minor by school authorities; 
(b) a written request for parental support in securing regular atten-
dance by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the 
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the 
notice is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) at least one meeting with the minor and the parents; 
(d) any necessary adjustment to the curriculum and schedule to meet 
special needs of the minor; and 
(e) monitoring school attendance of the minor for a period not to exceed 
30 days. 
(2) In addition to the efforts listed in Subsection (1), the local school board 
or school district may enlist the assistance of community and law enforcement 
agencies as appropriate and reasonably feasible. 
(3) In the event that the minor's school attendance problem cannot be 
resolved by the efforts of the local school board or school district, the local 
school board or school district shall refer the school-age minor to the appro-
priate district or county attorney or juvenile court as a habitual truant. 
(4) Any parent of a school-age minor shall, upon written request from a local 
school board or school district, cooperate with school authorities in resolving 
the minor's school attendance problem. 
(5) A local school board may authorize the issuance of truancy citations by 
school administrators and appointed truancy specialists. Recipients of truancy 
citations may be subjected to administrative penalties, and to a fee assessed in 
accordance with a uniform fee schedule adopted by the State Board of 
Education. 
(6) A local school board that authorizes the issuance of truancy citations 
shall establish a procedure for students to contest citations. Any minor having 
received three prior truancy citations within a single school year and for whom 
reasonable efforts to resolve the attendance problem have failed, shall be 
issued a habitual truancy citation and referred by the local school board or 
school district to the appropriate county or district attorney or juvenile court as 
a habitual truant. Proceedings for habitual truancy shall be expedited by the 
court. 
(7) This section shall not impose any civil liability on boards of education or 
their employees. Proceedings initiated under this part do not obligate or 
preclude action by the Division of Child and Family Services under Section 
78-3a-316. 
History: C. 1953, 63A-11-103, enacted by ch. 302, § 4; 1996, ch. 1, § 5; 1999, ch. 99, § 3. 
L. 1988, ch. 143, § 1; 1990, ch. 78, § 34; 1995, Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
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77-8-3 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
which one actually stabbed the victim, the present. State v. Mincy, 838 R2d 648 (Utah Ct. 
procedure was a showup, and accordingly, de- App. 1992). 
fendant did not have the right to have counsel 
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not attempt to influence the 
identification of any particular suspect. 
History: C. 1953, 77-8-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by suspect. 
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations 
between the witnesses and the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall 
have access to and may make copies of the record and any photographs taken 
of him or any other persons in connection with the lineup. 
History: C. 1953, 77-8-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
CHAPTER 8a 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES 
Section 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defen-
dants. 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant 
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor 
and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both 
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more 
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. 
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(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a 
single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief 
as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived 
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a 
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
History: C. 1953, 77-8a-l, enac ted by L. 
1990, ch . 201, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is a re-
codification of former Rule 9 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Notes to cases constru-
ing tha t rule are included in the notes to this 
section. 
Cross-References. — Limited admissibility 
of evidence, Rule 105, U.R.E. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Common scheme or plan. 
Denial of severance. 
—Harmless error. 
—Standard of review. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Failure to request severance. 
Joinder or severance of defendants. 
—Antagonistic defenses. 
—Cautionary instructions. 
—Specific cases. 
—Waiver of objections. 
Joinder or severance of offenses. 
—In general. 
—Specific cases. 
—Waiver of objections. 
Motions to sever. 
—Timeliness. 
Prejudicial joinder. 
Cited. 
Common s c h e m e or plan. 
In a case charging aggravated robberies 
based on two separate incidents with parallel 
fact patterns, i.e., defendant went to gay bars, 
targeted gay men, offered them a ride on his 
motorcycle, drove them to a canyon, robbed 
them at knife point, forced them to undress, 
scattered their clothes, and left them alone in 
the canyon, there was sufficient basis for the 
trial court to conclude that the crimes were 
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme 
or plan" under this section. State v. Lee, 831 
R2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Murder and theft charges were connected 
together and were alleged to be par t of a com-
mon scheme or plan where defendant's purpose 
in taking a car and firearms was to facilitate his 
flight from the scene of the murder. State v. 
Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Denial of s eve rance . 
—Harmless error. 
Even though the trial court erred in refusing 
to sever the trial of codefendants based on 
antagonistic defenses, that error, as well as any 
resulting constitutional error, was harmless. 
State v. Telford, 940 R2d 522 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
—Standard of review. 
A denial of severance will be reversed by the 
appellate court only iif it is affirmatively shown 
tha t a defendant's right to a fair trial has been 
impaired. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1986). 
Discret ion of trial court. 
In absence of showing that trial court abused 
its discretion, appellate court will not interfere 
with action of the t n a l court in denying sepa-
rate trials to two defendants charged with 
gambling violation. State v. Burke, 102 Utah 
249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942). 
Where accused cannot demand a severance 
as a mat ter of right, it must appear that the 
tr ial court had before it facts indicating tha t 
accused would be unduly prejudiced by a joint 
trial before the Supreme Court will hold that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
the motion. State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1947). 
The grant or denial of severance is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), ce r t denied, 
439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 
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teen-year-old boy without making effort to de-
termine whether he was a juvenile, nor 
whether he was giving his true name and 
address, the defendant aided and encouraged 
the juvenile to violate former § 58-17-14.13 by 
using a false name to procure drugs, and where 
defendant's conduct was shown to be "criminal 
negligence," he was guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 
2d 365, 463 P.2d 806, 36 A.L.R.3d 1283 (1970). 
— Proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Prosecution had burden of proving defen-
dant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt in juve-
nile court proceeding on charge of contributing 
to delinquency of minor since, in such cases, 
juvenile court is required to conform to practice 
and procedure for criminal proceedings in dis-
trict court. State v. Taylor, 21 Utah 2d 425, 446 
P.2d 954 (1968). 
Charge of contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt to support a conviction; uncorroborated 
testimony of the victim is sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Middelstadt, 579 R2d 908 (Utah 1978). 
Sheltering runaway child. 
Providing shelter to runaway child as part of 
church program for alienated youth did not 
violate section because child was not induced or 
encouraged to run away, did not engage in 
unlawful or immoral behavior, and was not 
exposed to unlawful or immoral activity on the 
part of others; defendants had no duty to inves-
tigate child's age or residence or to report her to 
parents or authorities. State v. Macri, 28 Utah 
2d 68, 498 P.2d 355 (1972). 
Running away from home by a minor child is 
not a violation of law, and if there has been no . 
reference to the juvenile court by an agency, the 
runaway child is not a delinquent within the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction, and any conduct 
tending to cause the child to remain a runaway 
does not constitute the crime of contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor. State v. Dung Hung 
Vo, 585 P.2d 464 (Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443. 
C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S. Infants § 7. 
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for contributing 
to delinquency of minor as affected by the fact 
that minor has not become a delinquent, 18 
A.L.R.3d 824. 
Mens rea or guilty intent a necessary ele-
ment of offense of contributing to delinquency 
or dependency of minor, 31 A.L.R.3d 848. 
Key Numbers. — Infants s=> 18. 
78-3a-802, Penalty — Fines — Suspension of sentence on 
condition — Bond. 
(1) A person 18 years of age or older who commits any act described in this 
section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Any fines collected shall be 
deposited in the treasury of the county where the action is filed. 
(2) The court may suspend execution of a sentence upon compliance with 
reasonable conditions which the court may establish. 
(3) The court may further require that a bond, in a reasonable amount, be 
posted by the person convicted under this chapter to guarantee the perfor-
mance of the condition. The laws and procedures governing bond forfeitures 
shall apply in proceedings commenced in this court to forfeit the bond and any 
amount so forfeited shall be deposited into the treasury of the county where the 
action was brought. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-802, enacted by L. 
1996, ch. 1, § 73. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 
makes the act effective on January 31, 1996. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
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History: C. 1953, 78-3a-603, enacted by L. a78-3a-116" for "78-3a-512w and "78-3a-913" for 
1996, ch. 1, § 71; 1996, ch. 66, fc 4; 1996, ch. a78-3a-513" in Subsection (9). 
239, § 3; 1997, ch. 365, § 44. Cross-References. — False statements at 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- preliminary hearings, § 76-8-504.5. 
ment, effective March 21, 1997, substituted 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in A.B. v. State, 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). 
PART 8 
ADULT OFFENSES 
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses against mi-
nors — Proof of delinquency not required for 
conviction. 
(1) The court shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the district court or 
justice court otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction, to try adults for the 
following offenses committed against minors: 
(a) unlawful sale or supply of alcohol beverage or product to minors in 
violation of Section 32A-12-203; 
(b) failure to report child abuse or neglect, as required by Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Requirements; 
(c) harboring a minor in violation of Section 62A-4a-501; 
(d) misdemeanor custodial interference in violation of Section 76-5-303; 
(e) contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of Section 
76-10-2301; 
(f) failure to comply with compulsory education requirements in viola-
tion of Section 53A-11-101. 
(2) It is not necessary for the minor to be found to be delinquent or to have 
committed a delinquent act for the court to exercise jurisdiction under 
Subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953,78-3a-801, enacted by L. tion, substituting the references to statutory 
1996, ch. 1, § 72; 1999, ch. 249, § 2. offenses for a list of descriptions of prohibited 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- conduct; 
ment, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote this sec-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS quent" is not specifically defined. State v. 
„ ,. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54,975 P.2d 489. 
Constitutionality. 
Supplying alcohol to minors. Supplying alcohol to minors. 
Constitutionality. The defendant's mere presence at a drinking 
This statute is not unconstitutionally vague; party was not tantamount to permitting minors 
the language of this section provides adequate to consume alcohol as formerly proscribed by 
notice to the ordinary reader of the prohibited this section. State v. Terwilliger, 1999 UT App 
conduct despite the fact that the term "delin- 337, 992 P.2d 490. 
78-3a-802. Practice and procedure — Jury trial. 
(1) The county attorney or district attorney, as provided under Sections 
17-18-1 and 17-18-1.7, shall prosecute any case brought under this part. 
ADDENDUM "A5 
San Rafael Junior High 
Merlin Weber, Principal 
P.O. Box 790 
Ferron, Utah 84523 
November 24, 1999 
Dear Valery 
I've talked with the teachers about the homework, and they will get an assignment for Monday, 
but then they &ant you to return it to them for correction before they prepaie more. That would 
mean that you'd have to come by school each afternoon to either pick up homework or drop it 
off. I hope this will help. 
Please remember that if you don't call in to excuse Elise, her attendance records show an 
unexcused absence. Also, we were supposed to have doctor's notes for each absence. 
Sincerely 
Phone(435)384-2335 
Fax (435) 384-3354 
Merlin Weber 
Emery County School District 
Second Excessive Absence Citation 
(Fourth, fifth, and sixth unexcused absences) 
Student's Name: ^ 7 ; , ^ ""7%/?'$<£*>•?>& /j Grade:_ 
School: ^ ?^si/l ft/jj&ail D a t e : /1/&, 
Date of Fourth Unexcused Absence: // /(?£&l 
^ L All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
tf/fifff Date of Fifth Unexcused Absence^ 
J# All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
Date of Sixth Unexcused Absence: ///^•y/^/ 
pC AllDay 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has six (6) unexcused 
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular 
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being 
filed against the parent/guardian. 
^/^///K^ Title 
COMMENT(S): ^ s^ltsj ^ *r&# ttsW^/fr*SA<2£ 
Emery County School District 
First Excessive Absence Citation 
(First, second, and third unexcused absences) 
Student's Name: £~/j*)^> '^Tk^i^t/Pf^^ Grade:_ 
School: v-^V^ y- Date: 
Date of First Unexcused Absence: 
& All Day 
u Partial Day - CIasses:_ 
Q Individual Class: 
M//fff 
/ 
Teacher: 
Date of Second Unexcused Absence: ////u /y / 
J3 All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
Date of Third Unexcused Absence: / / / / 7 / ^ ^ 
^f All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has three (3) unexcused 
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular 
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being 
filed against the parent/guardian. 
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a meeting with the school 
principal/assistant principal to discuss their students attendance problem before the student is 
allowed to return to school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date and 
time. 
^MiUM*- /2^/yf/^u/^ 
COMMENT(S): /M^4- ^7^ 
-jl&*? /4 SSs 
*~j& '^J&MAJL ^n/^ 
/->/<?// / / / / •°°UO')HV pOJi^A 0 U i l r | U ^U + 0 U 
/-> > 7 / V / / / / .^^Ucy^qy ^ b u ^ ^ w u ) | -P-ii-( 4^ ^ J ^ U 
ADDENDUM "B 
San Rafael Junior High 
Merlin Weber, Principal 
P.O. Box 790 
Ferron, Utah 84523 
November 15, 1999 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Thompson 
I'm concerned that Elise is still not attending school, and that you don't call to excuse her 
anymore. On the days that you don't call to excuse her, if we can't contact you by phone, she 
has an unexcused absence. Because of new school attendance laws, it becomes necessary for us 
to issue a truancy citation when students have unexcused absences. Because of so many 
unexcused absences, she's at the point that she should be referred to court for that problem alone. 
I would like to workout an arrangement and get Elise in school. You have a responsibility to get 
her to school and I have a responsibility to report when she doesn't attend. I believe that there 
must be some way to solve the problem. As I've told you before, we've had students with 
serious diabetic problems that we've been able to accommodate with the help and direction of 
the parents. Since you live so close, you'd be able to get here quickly when she has problems we 
can't handle. Elise has missed so much school that it's going to be difficult for her to return 
now, but we'll do everything we can to help her. Please come in and lets talk about how to 
solve the problem. 
Sincerely 
Phone (435) 384-2335 
Fax (435) 384-3354 
Merlin Weber 
